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Abstract: This paper is the first attempt in the literature to investigate the effects of
public social security on aggregate consumption in a time-series setting for a developing
country, Turkey that has one of the most generous social security systems in the OECD
region. In order to quantify the social security variable, the paper uses the social
security wealth (SSW) series calculated for Turkey in a separate study. This study
indicates that SSW is the largest part of the household wealth in Turkey and therefore
should not be ignored in the aggregate consumption studies. After having all sensitivity
tests for the major assumptions embedded in the SSW series, it shows that SSW has
robust and positive effects on aggregate consumption, and therefore the PAYG system
suppresses the Turkish national saving approximately 25% in 2003.
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Public insurance is the single largest item in government budgets and has a
significant impact on the lives of thousands of people. In addition to its effect on the living
standards of elderly people, Social Security may alter people’s behavior in ways that could
affect the economy. People who are entitled to some sort of social security payments in the
future may prefer to consume more today and save less for their retirement. If public social
security is unfunded (pay-as-you-go —PAYG), this decrease in personal saving may even
reduce national saving.
There are two types of studies conducted in the literature to see whether or not
social security affects personal and national savings: empirical studies and simulations.
Empirical studies are based on three types of data sets and therefore might be classified
accordingly: time-series, cross-sectional, and cross-country analyses.
This paper is the first attempt in the literature to investigate the saving effect of
public social security in a time-series setting for a developing country, Turkey. One reason
for this scarcity of studies might be the limited availability of data for developing countries.
Even though Turkey is not immune to this sort of problem, it has relatively better data
sources and a long history with a public social security system. Another reason could be
the difficulty in calculating a proxy that represents an aggregate perception of household
social security wealth.
The first step in time-series studies is to calculate the total (aggregated) Social
Security Wealth (SSW) series over the years for the economy. SSW is the net present
value of the future benefits and contributions with survival probabilities. Since it’s a highly
concentrated work, we have constructed the SSW series for Turkey from 1970 to 2003 in a
separate study (Author, 2005). A simple comparison shows that SSW is the largest part of
the total household wealth in Turkey.
A typical aggregate time-series study tests whether, as total SSW changes over
time, aggregate saving also changes. Some studies observe changes in consumption, while
others look directly at saving. The present study uses an aggregate consumption function
in a life-cycle model (LCM) setting (Ando and Modigliani 1963) to investigate whether or
not the time-series data provide some evidence for this claim. We extend the pure life-cycle
consumption model to incorporate other factors that could influence aggregate
consumption, such as uncertainty, credit constraints, unemployment, demographic changes
and the interest rate.
The most important aspect of this study is not only that Turkey is a developing
country but also that it has one of the most generous social security systems in the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) region. Our
estimation results show that SSW has significant and positive effects on consumption, and
this could be interpreted as implying that public social security reduces saving in Turkey.
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 1 provides a brief background on the
relationship between saving and public social security and summarizes the time-series
literature on the subject. The generosity of the Turkish social security system is discussed
in Section 2. Section 3 discusses social security wealth in Turkey. The model and results
of the empirical tests are given in Section 4. The conclusions are in Section 5. The
Appendix provides a brief summary of the SSW calculations for Turkey.
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1. Background and Literature Review
There are two major competing theories for testing whether or not social security or
any type of government debt affects savings: the life-cycle model (Modigliani and
Brumberg 1954) and the infinite-horizon model (Barro 1974). Agents in the life-cycle
model receive utility only from their own consumption and take the whole life-span into
account when planning consumption. They reduce their saving if their retirement is
financed by levying taxes on the working generation. Whereas the Barro’s infinite-horizon
model shows that when the life-cycle model is extended with altruistic bequest where
agents receive utility from their descendants, saving might not be affected.
The life-cycle hypothesis within a simple two-period overlapping generations
setting provides a suitable framework for analyzing the effect of social security on saving
where a rational forward-looking worker faces no borrowing constraints, capital market
imperfections, and uncertainty. If the worker has a constant labor supply and saves only
for retirement, when a social security system is introduced, he dissaves exactly the same
amount that he contributes to the system, provided that the implicit rate of return on the
taxes (contributions) is equal to the market interest rate. In other words, if the combination
of social security contributions and benefits does not alter the individual’s lifetime budget
constraint, savings will fall by just enough to leave consumption during retirement
unchanged. That is, he would substitute one asset for another, because social security and
private saving are perfect substitutes. If the rate of return on the taxes is higher (lower) than
the market interest rate, the worker dissaves more (less). 3 If the social security system is
unfunded, i.e., if most of the revenue from contributions goes directly to retirees as in
PAYG, this reduction in personal saving is not offset by a rise in government saving, and,
as a result, national saving falls.
The simple model above assumes that people save only for retirement and do not
receive and leave bequests in an environment where capital markets are perfect, the social
security benefits are paid in lump sum, and there are no uncertainties in future income
streams and life expectancies. Within the framework of a traditional life-cycle model, as we
relax these assumptions, the provision of social security may not offset personal saving
one-for-one even if the net social security wealth (NSSW) is zero as outlined below.
• Uncertainty. People may not be so certain about their future income stream. With
uncertain earnings, households save more for precautionary motives relative to less
urgent retirement saving in their early ages. As income uncertainty increases, the
negative effect of old-age pension entitlements on personal saving becomes
stronger for older people who are close to retirement, but not so for younger
population. Thus the offset between social security and private saving tends to be
less than one-for-one for younger households but increases as retirement saving
becomes more important (Engen and Gale 1997).

3

If the implicit return on contributions (ssr) is equal to the market interest rate (r) then the present value
of benefits is equal to present value of contributions, i.e. the net social security wealth (NSSW) zero,
when the discounting occurs at the market interest rate. If ssr > r NSSW becomes positive. In this case,
social security increases the lifetime budget constraint and consumption in each period would rise.
Therefore, private saving would fall by more than the worker’s contribution. If NSSW is negative, the
opposite occurs. Seidman (1999).
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Capital markets. If financial markets are not well developed, people cannot smooth
their consumption by borrowing against their future income. This may increase the
need for precautionary saving. As precautionary savings become more important
for short-term income risks, the effect of social security provisions on personal
savings fades. Likewise, families may have fixed saving goals such as a downpayment for a house. With capital market constraints, they may be forced to reduce
their consumption in response to social security payments, which in turn prevents
personal saving from falling one-for-one.
Annuity payments. Benefits are received by annuities not in a lump sum payment at
retirement. Annuity payments may not finance unexpected large expenses and
cannot be bequeathed to heirs. Therefore social security wealth itself may not be
compatible with other types of personal wealth and thus social security
contributions may not crowd out personal saving one-for-one.
Other saving motives. The effect of social security contributions on personal saving
depends on the substitutability of personal saving and social security contributions.
If households save primarily as a precaution, they will consider social security
contributions illiquid since benefit payments will not start before retirement.
Therefore, social security will not replace personal saving one-for-one.
Insurance. Moreover, since annuities provide insurance against the risk of
uncertainty about longevity and personal saving cannot offset the insurance part of
social security contributions, one might argue that the existence of social security
could magnify a reduction in personal saving. 4
Retirement effect. When we allow households to vary the amount of labor supply
supplied, consumption could be substituted by leisure. As explained in the
Feldstein’s influential paper (1974), when social security is introduced, individuals
may reduce their retirement age. This reduction in turn decreases the lifetime
wealth by shortening the earning stream. Therefore, social security induces early
retirement and increases personal saving during working years in order to finance
longer retirement financial needs. This offsetting retirement effect reduces the
power of the asset substitution effect. It is, therefore, theoretically possible that
personal saving may even rise if the existing social security system induces a very
early retirement age.
Partial equilibrium. In addition to these partial equilibrium effects, there are
general equilibrium effects as well. A reduction in saving may cause a lower
capital accumulation and in turn may reduce real wages. A reduction in wages, in
turn, may result in a decrease in consumption and an increase in saving. Therefore,
as Siedman (1984) shows, general equilibrium effects may dampen effects of social
security on saving.
Attached benefits. Social security wealth calculations ignore attached benefits such
as health insurance and unemployment benefits. All these additional benefits can
make the social security effects on personal saving stronger.

4

This type of insurance is less available in the private sector due to the adverse selection problem.
Empirical studies show clear evidence that there is indeed an adverse selection problem in voluntary
annuity markets (Finkelstein and Poterba (2004)).
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Cultural factors, lack of urbanization (Novos 1989), inefficient social development,
and an uneducated population would make a big difference in expected rational behaviors,
which are supposed to be consistent with the life-cycle theory. Furthermore, there is a
tension between the justifications for a compulsory social security system and the
justification for why social security affects saving: social security (public social saving
systems) exists because people are myopic and cannot plan and save for their future.
However, social security systems affect personal saving because people are foresighted and
adjust their consumption and saving behaviors due to future social security changes. As a
result, it is theoretically ambiguous whether future social security entitlements negatively
affect saving.
In the literature, empirical studies that study social security effects on savings are
based on three different types of data sets and might be classified accordingly: crosssection, time-series, and cross-country analyses. While cross-section researches analyze
whether people with relatively high expectations in social security benefits hold relatively
low private wealth, time-series analyses calculate the SSW series for the entire economy
and then use it to see whether or not the aggregate consumption over time is higher as the
SSW gets higher. Cross-country analyses compare different countries to see if the saving
rate is linked to the generosity of public social security provisions.
The first time-series analysis was done by Feldstein in 1974. He adopts the
consumption function used by Ando and Modigliani (1963) and extends it by adding his
new SSW variable. In both of his studies in 1974 and 1996, Feldstein found statistically
significant results showing that SSW affects consumption positively. In his influential
1974 paper, he claims that the social security provision reduces personal saving by 30% to
50% in the US; while in 1996 he finds that the effect is almost 60%.
Many time-series studies were done following Feldstien (1974). 5 Among the most
important studies on time-series analyses are the following. Munell (1974) looks at the
same issue with endogenous retirement age and finds that a negative effect of benefits on
saving is canceled out by a positive effect of early retirement. Darby (1979) uses the money
supply and relative price of durables goods in his regression and finds negative effect in
most cases. Coates and Humphreys (1999) investigate the linearity of the equation in
Feldstein’s (1996) paper. Meguire (1998) disaggregates the personal disposable income by
using Kormandi’s (1983) augmented consolidated approach and confirms Feldstein’s
(1996) results. Finally, Blake (2004) uses error correction models and finds that state
pensions have a strong saving replacement effect in the UK. A more inclusive list for the
literature on time-series studies is given in Table 1.

5

For an extensive literature review on the subject see OECD (1998), Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
memorandum (1998), Engen, E. and Gale, W. (1997), and Magnussen (1994).
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Table 1: Time-Series Studies
SSW
Authors - Country
Sample Period
Dependent Variable
Coefficient
Feldstein (1974) USA
1930-71
Consumption
S
Munnell (1974) USA
1929-69
Personal Savings
S
Barro (1978) USA
1929-74
Consumption
NS
Darby (1979) USA
1924-74
Consumption
NS
Markowski and Palmer (1979) Sweden
1952-75
Pers. Saving/Income
S
Boyle and Murrey (1979) Canada
1946-75
Pers. Saving
NS
Pfaff, Hurler, Dennerlein (1979) Germany 1965-78
Pers. Saving/Income
NS
Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) USA
1930-74
Consumption
NS
Browning (1982) UK
1966-79 (Quarterly)
Consumption
S
Lee and Chao (1988) USA
1947-77
Pers. Saving & LFPR
NS
Magnussen (1994) Norway
1966-90
Consumption
NS
Rossi & Visco (1995) Italy
1954-93
Consumption
S
Feldstein (1996) USA
1930-92
Consumption
S
Meguire (1998) USA
1930-92
Consumption
S
Coates and Humphreys (1999) USA
1930-92
Consumption
S
Blake (2004) UK
1948-94
Consumption
S
Notes: S and NS denote Significant and Not Significant respectively

Three important criticisms of Feldstein’s 1974 paper are Barro (1978), Leimer
and Lesnoy (1982), and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983). The negative effect of funding
structure of a social security program on national saving has been challenged by Barro
(1974, 1989). Unlike the life-cycle model, the Barro’s infinite-horizon model assumes
that agents are altruistic and care about descendant’s consumption as well. Barro claims
that the mandatory transfers from young to old could be offset by voluntary transfers
from old to young under altruistic bequest motives and therefore funding status does
not affect national saving. Barro uses the same SSW data series with three additional
major variables: unemployment, government deficit (or surplus), and a new SSW 6
variable in addition to Feldstein’s SSW. He concludes that when the new variables are
included the SSW coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. Barro grounds this
result on two factors: intergenerational transfers offset the fall in saving, and an inept
representation of the perception of people by Feldstein’s SSW due to aggregation
problems. 7
The main criticism of Feldstein’s paper came from Leimer and Lesnoy (1982).
They find that the effect is insignificant when they use different methods for the
formation of expectations in the perception of benefits. Their criticism can be
summarized in three points. First, the regression results are very sensitive to the time
frame. Second, small adjustments in the SSW calculation make a big difference in its
coefficient. Third, the expectation formation method for the perception of benefits and
taxes that Feldstein used is highly speculative. 8

6

Barro’s alternative measure of social security is calculated based on current benefit rates and current
worker coverage under social security.
7
See Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) and Seidman (1984).
8
Feldstein replies both Barro’s (1978) and Leimer and Lesnoy’s (1982) criticisms in Feldstein (1976a,
1976b, 1978 and 1982)
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Finally, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983), in a simulation, show that time-series
coefficients are not stable because of the aggregation problems. They argue that the
coefficients of a life-cycle consumption function depend on the individual’s age and
differ at any point in time. Therefore, if the age structure of a population is not stable,
aggregation of individual consumption functions over all households may cause
unstable coefficients.
2. The Turkish Public Social Security System
The framework for old-age security in Turkey, as in most developing countries,
traditionally involves state-managed pension schemes that pay an earning-related
defined benefit financed on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. Turkey’s social security
system consists of three distinct institutions—Social Insurance Institution (Sosyal
Sigortalar Kurumu - SSK) for wage earners in private and public sectors, Bag-Kur
(BK) for self-employed individuals and farmers, and Retirment Fund (Emekli Sandigi ES) for civil servants—covering different areas of the labor market.
As most PAYG systems in the world, Turkey’s PAYG system have created
significant fiscal deficits, labor market distortions, and wicked redistribution to higher
income groups, without providing adequate income security for the old. The populist
social security policies of Turkish governments over the years have impaired the
system whose total deficit approached 4.5% of GNP per year in 2004. Between 1990
and 2003, the present value of the total resources used to finance the deficit of the
social security system is almost equal to the total GNP created by Turkey in 2003. 9
The financial problem of the Turkey’s social security system is resulted from
both decreasing revenues and increasing expenses. The lack of a minimum retirement
age, which had been removed in 1992, has been the major factor for the financial
imbalance—Turkey had retirement ages as young as 47 years of age in SSK and 48
years of age in ES, the lowest in the world. 10 Moreover, Turkey is the only country in
the world that simultaneously had very low minimum contribution periods (in some
cases as low as 10 years) and high replacement rates (90% in SSK, 127% in Bag-Kur,
and 106% in ES) 11 with a lack of minimum retirement age before the 1999 reform (The
World Bank Country Economic Memorandum, 2000).
The weak link 12 between contributions and benefits before 1999 created an
incentive for workers to declare the earnings base for premium at a lower value. The
high informal employment due to relatively high statutory contribution rates, the lack of
automatic indexation of the contribution ceiling 13 under high inflation conditions, and
the low premium collection rates because of administrative inefficiencies worsened the
already financially imbalanced system. As a result, the system became a major fiscal
9

“Proposal for Reform in the Social Security System” (2004), Ministry of Labor and Social Security
Minimum ages were very low even before 1999. The average minimum retirement ages
for OECD countries are 64.4 for men and 63.9 for women in 2002 (OECD 2005).
11
These rates reflects 2004 values and taken from “Proposal for Reform in the Social Security System”
(2004), Ministry of Labor and Social Security. P.19
12
In SSK, pensions were linked to wages paid in the last five years and the same link was even worse in
ES and Bag-Kur: only the last year’s wages were used to calculate pensions.
13
The ceiling on wages subject to social security contribution in the fall of 1995 actually fell below the
minimum wage.
10
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burden, damaging Turkey’s macroeconomic stability. Coupled with other structural
problems in the economy, the severe financial crisis early in 1999 forced Turkish
government led by the World Bank to reform the impaired social security system in
August 1999. This “parametric” reform was intended to achieve the actuarial balance of
the PAYG system in the mid-term and to reduce pressure on the borrowing needs of the
government.
In summary, the most fundamental characteristics of the Turkish social security
system have been its generosity (relative to income) due to very young average
retirement ages (in some cases 38 for women and 47 for men 14 ), low minimum
contribution periods, and high replacement rates. As seen in Table 2 below, according
to a new research by the OECD (2005), a new entrant in Turkey has $74,000 average
gross pension wealth with $2,510 per capita gross national income, while the same
numbers are $183,000 and $35,430 for the US in 2002. In addition, Turkey’s gross
replacement rate (87.2%) is the highest in the OECD region, which has 56.7% of the
same rate as an average. 15 While this generosity has paved the way for the collapse of
the system’s actuarial and financial soundness and still presents a big problem for the
system’s sustainability, one would expect that this generosity would also have strong
effects on consumption and saving behaviors of individuals, which in turn may
influence macro economic dynamics. It is this generosity that makes the Turkish case
special relative to other developing countries in the literature.
Table 2: Pension and Income (2002, in US Dollars)

Hungary
Slovak Republic
Czech Republic
Mexico
Poland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Canada
OECD Average

Per Capita
GNI
5,100
4,080
5,880
5,950
4,680
2,510
25,560
35,430
22,610

Average Replacement
Wage
Rate
4,187
75.4
3,031
48.6
6,306
44.4
6,180
36.0
6,456
56.9
87.2
6,571
29,133
37.1
32,360
38.6
24,756
42.5
56.9

Gross
Pension
Wealth
55,000
27,000
47,000
28,000
51,000
74,000
172,000
183,000
163,000
202,367

Relative
Pension
Wealth
11.7
7.9
6.9
4.5
7.7
10.3
5.5
5.2
6.1
8.7

Relative
Pension
Level
72.2
47.9
41.7
35.7
55.5
81.3
37.1
36.5
39.9
55.4

Notes: Except GNI, the others are taken form OECD (2005). Average Wage: the average annual earning
for a production worker. Replacement Rate (men): a pension entitlement (first annuity) as a share of
individual’s last earning. Gross Pension Wealth (average): the discounted stream of future pension
payments for a new entrant in 2002. Relative Pension Level (men): the weighted average of the pension
entitlements (first annuity) expressed as a percentage of economy-wide average earnings. Relative
Pension Wealth (men): the weighted average of pension wealth as a multiple of economy-wide average
earnings. Gross National Income, GNI, is taken from WDI (The World Bank).

14

See “Turk Emeklilik Sisteminde Reform” (The Reform in Turkish Pension System) TUSIAD November
2004 P.108
15
Excluding Luxemburg which is an outlier with 101.9% gross replacement rate.
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3. Social Security Wealth Series for Turkey
The heart of the time-series analyses is the calculation of the aggregate social
security wealth (SSW) variable. In a life-cycle setting, the future income should
include both pensions and labor income. Since pension annuities are received only by
retirees, the rest of the population should form expectations for the future pension
entitlements based on their labor income and related social security regulations.
The social security wealth (SSW) is one of the calculations, as a proxy for
expected benefits, for measuring the effect of social security on consumption. This
proxy represents people’s perception of social security benefits that they will have in
the future.
The aggregate SSW, which is basically the net aggregate present value of future
social security annuities and tax liabilities with survival probabilities anticipated by
people, was conceptualized and calculated for the first time by Feldstein in his (1974)
paper.
We applied the same methodology used in Feldsetein (1974) paper and
calculated the SSW series for 34 years from 1970 to 2003 at 1987 prices for Turkey in a
separate study (Author 2005). We choose this period since the data about the
demographics of labor market are not readily available for earlier years. The detailed
information about the construction of SSW series can be found in Author (2005) and a
brief summary is given in the Appendix.
In order to calculate the SSW series, a “reference income” is needed at two
points: in the calculation of benefit and tax factors and in the calculation of the first
annuities. Since there is no “survey” based “Personal Disposable Income” (PDI) series
in Turkey, We have used Net Private Disposable Income (NprvDI) series generated
from the national accounts.
We have fist attempted to generate PDI by using national account identities:
PDI ~ª NNP – TX + TR – RE + NINT 16 . However, because of the problems in finding
reliable information on the components of PDI above, We use NPrvDI instead. The
difference between NprvDI and PDI, as shown below, simply is retained earnings (RE),
on which we don’t have any data for Turkey.
If we subtract taxes (TX) and add transfers (TR) and net interest payments by
government (NINT) from and to both sides of a simple textbook version of the national
account identity, we get the following:
16

Net National Product (NNP) = GNP – Depreciation
Net Income (NI) = NNP – Indirect Taxes (InTX) + Subsidies
PDI = NI – (Corporate Profits-Corporate Dividends) + Net Interest (NINT) + (Transfers (TR)Contribution to Social Security (SS)) – Personal Taxes (PrsTX)
Since (Corporate Profits-Corporate Dividends) = (Corporate Taxes (CorpTX)–Retained Earnings (RE))
PDI = NI – (CorpTX + RE) + NINT + TR - SSTX – PrsTX
PDI = NNP – (IndTX + Subsidies) – (CorpTX + RE) + NINT + TR - SSTX – PrsTX
If we group taxes then
PDI = NNP- (IndTX + CorpTX + SSTX + PrsTX) + TR + NINT -RE
Since the first parenthesis on the right hand side is simply TX (Taxes) we can generate the following
identity for national account:
PDI ~∫ NNP – TX + TR – RE + NINT. A similar method is used by Meguire (1998) and he finds that
the difference between the “generated” PDI and survey based PDI is statistically insignificant for the US.
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GNP – TX + TR + NINT = C + I - (TX – G – TR - NINT) + (NX + NFI) 17
The expression on the left hand side is Gross Private Disposable Income (GprvDI), and
the first and second parentheses on the right side are government saving (GS) and
foreign sources (FS) respectively. Therefore the above identity becomes
GPrvDI = C + I – GS + FS 18
If the consumption of capital (CoC) is subtracted from both sides, we get
NPrvDI = NNP – TX + TR + NINT
As seen from this identity, the difference between NprvDI and PDI is RE. Therefore,
as long as individuals perceive undistributed profits as capital gains (hence a part of
their income), the difference between NprvDI and PDI could be insignificant 19 . We
use the following NprvDI definition as reference income series in the SSW calculations
and regressions 20 .
NprvDI = C + I – GS + FS - CoC
We have generated several different SSW series by using alternative
assumptions and parameters. First of all, as explained in the Appendix, we apply three
different types of expectation method in the formation of SSW series. In addition to
that, we use two different discount rates: 3% and 5%. We found the growth rate for the
per capita NprvDI to be 1.88%, so we use 2% income growth rate for the 34-year
period. Finally, we assume that annuities after retirement can grow either by 2% (same
as income) or remain the same so that the nominal increase can be as much as the price
inflation.

17

GNP, Gross National Product; C, Consumption; I, Investment; G, Government Expenditures; NX, Net
Export; NFI, Net Factor Income from the rest of the world.
18
GprvDI is also calculated by the State Planning Organization (SPO) in Turkey since 1987, using similar
methods, in a table called as “General Macro Balance of the Economy”,.
19
See Feldstein (1974), Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Barro (1978).
20
The consumption, investment and consumption of capital series are taken from OECD database, GS is
from State Planning Organization (SPO) and FS is from SPO and World Development Indicators (WDI –
from the World Bank).
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Table 3: Total Wealth in Financial Assets, Housing and SSW with NPrvDI
(Million TL in 1987 Prices)
TFA
Housing
SSWG
SSWN
NPrvDI
54,350,527 43,721,351 25,592,525
7,588,518 32,700,333
1970
10,806,548 41,781,557
89,508,490 69,086,105 33,269,315
1975
9,674,345 56,696,805
63,905,043 33,945,697 42,029,239
1980
62,728,296 24,296,819 45,873,753
20,075,898 63,750,469
1985
26,996,582 88,709,913 111,574,201 65,316,832 67,179,895
1990
46,704,601 128,391,319 103,123,054 49,536,263 84,157,732
1995
61,819,289 135,536,058 171,916,203 119,046,643 86,040,622
1996
69,998,934 152,101,623 231,487,100 160,536,942 92,590,536
1997
75,985,989 160,030,906 277,262,042 185,039,302 102,044,735
1998
96,063,696 159,652,714 292,422,907 198,503,687 102,748,644
1999
95,036,365 159,160,494 276,903,910 185,179,981 103,808,861
2000
146,103,010 165,728,972 270,810,987 198,497,777 100,472,296
2001
126,833,322 158,074,788 297,929,986 236,761,695 98,286,544
2002
117,491,297 166,061,466 342,736,721 283,310,716 105,211,662
2003
Notes: SSW series are calculated by 3% discount rate, 2% growth rate (income) with the “current
benefit factor” method. Total Financial Assets (TFA) is calculated by Turkish State Planning
Organization (SPO) for the entire economy regardless of who holds them. Housing wealth is an
approximation (Author, 2005).

The most important thing to observe is the magnitude of the SSW series relative
to NPrvDI and other wealth measures. This fact can be seen in Table 2 above. This
observation supports the argument that the social security wealth variable could be an
important determinant in saving and consumption studies. This result is also consistent
with the U.S social security wealth series done by Feldstein (1974) and Leimer and
Lesnoy (1982).
4. Empirical Results
As mentioned before, we use an aggregate consumption function in a pure LifeCycle model setting as a baseline model to investigate whether or not the time-series
data provide some evidence for the claim that an unfunded social security system has
positive effects on consumption, and thus, negative effects on saving. We also extend
the model to incorporate other factors, which possibly influence aggregate
consumption, such as uncertainty, unemployment, demographic changes, interest rate,
and borrowing constraints.
4.1 The Model and Data
A rational, forward-looking Household (HH), with inelastic labor supply,
maximizes its following lifetime utility subject to its lifetime budget constraint in a
perfect capital market without uncertainty:
T −i

U (t ) = ∑ (1 + ρ ) −t log C t
t =0
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T −i

T −i

t =0

t =0

∑ Ct /(1 + r ) t ≤ Wt + ∑ HWt /(1 + r ) t +SSWt
T is the age of death and i is the age of household. For example, if the individual is 25
years old and T is 85, then the maximum life duration for the individual is T-i=60. C
denotes consumption and W is real wealth, which is directly observable and consists of
housing wealth and financial assets. SSW is discounted present value of future benefits
with survival probabilities for every household. The retirement age is given by the law
and the maximum life (T) might be truncated at 85.
HW is human wealth and not directly observable. It’s the present value of
current and future labor incomes. Since it includes social security taxes, SSW may be
taken as gross.
The solution for this maximization problem is
T −i
⎡
⎤
HWt /(1 + r ) t
∑
⎢
Wt
SSWt ⎥
⎥,
+ t =0T −i
C t = d t ⎢ T −i
+ T −i
⎢ (1 + ρ ) −t
−t
−t ⎥
(1 + ρ )
(1 + ρ ) ⎥
∑
∑
⎢⎣ ∑
t =0
t =0
t =0
⎦

(1)

⎛ 1+ r ⎞
⎟⎟ .
where d = ⎜⎜
⎝1+ ρ ⎠
Since we further assume that the personal discount rate, r, is equal to the real interest
rate, r, d drops out. When we aggregate this individual solution over all households,
the resulting function can be represented by the following average (aggregate)
consumption function for the entire economy. 21
C t = β 0 + β 1Yt e + β 3Wt + β 4 SSWt

C represents consumption expenditures for households, Y e is the present value of
current and expected future income, W is the non-human household wealth and SSW is
the social security wealth.
We start the empirical test with the above baseline aggregate consumption,
which is used in Feldstein’s studies both in 1974 and in 1996. In this application, the
consumption expenditures include durable goods for the entire period between 1970
and 2003. This is because there is no information on the disaggregated household
consumption prior to 1987. Since we estimate only long-term dynamics between the
consumption and other variables by the equation above, the inclusion of durable goods
in the consumption expenditures does not present a problem. 22 “Income”, Y, was first
defined in Modigliani’s LCT study in 1963 as “labor income”. However, because of
21
22

See Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983).
See Mehra (2001).
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the difficulties involved in calculating implicit labor income for self-employed people,
“personal disposable income” (PDI) has been used as an alternative measure in later
consumption studies 23 . We use Net Private Disposable Income (NprvDI) in the
regressions in the absence of survey based PDI in Turkey. Nevertheless, PDI or NPrvDI
is not a perfect measure for LCM: they both include non-human incomes and transfers,
and therefore, constitute double counting. Since the expected future income is not
directly observable, we use the following rational expectation method in which the
current income is unknown and equal to the expectation of current income and a
forecast error ( ε ) with the standard assumptions NIID~(0,1), as expressed below.
Yt = Yt e + ε t = E (Yt / I t −1 ) + ε t
Yt e+ k = β Yt e where β ≅ 1

Households form their expectations at time t by using the available information (I) at
time t-1 and it is assumed that expected future income is proportional to expected
current income 24 .
There is no ready-to-use wealth series for households in Turkey, and we have a
range of problems in estimating both financial and housing wealth for households. In
private equity markets, for example, the first stock exchange, ISE, was formed in 1986.
Likewise, private pension funds are very new and not significant. Since the free float in
the Turkish market is significantly lower than 30% 25 (of the total outstanding equity),
the market capitalization is not an appropriate indicator for measuring the private equity
market even for the entire economy. Besides, the share of foreign investors in the
market is very high (approximately 50%) and the available information about the
household holdings in stocks is very limited.
Before 1980, since the interest rates on deposits were not free, they are not able
to reflect the “true” nominal rates under the conditions of high inflation and political
instability. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that the wealth was held mostly
in gold and housing by households before the liberalizations of the financial markets
(during the early 1980s). Since there are no available data, estimating gold holdings of
household is quite speculative for Turkey.
Moreover, after 1988, increasing needs in government borrowings made
government bonds one of the most demanded investment means for domestic investors.
However, since new accounting standards were put into effect in the banking sector
only after 2001, there is no reliable record for households’ holdings in government
bonds prior to that year.
The only adequate data among the household financial assets are on bank
deposits, which is the most common financial investment tool for ordinary households
particularly prior to 1990s. Therefore, we use the most common proxy for the financial
wealth used in the aggregate time-series consumption and saving investigations for
Turkey 26 : real money balances measured by Money-Quasi money (M2).
23

See Blinder et al. (1985), Darby (1979), Feldstein (1974 and 1996), Modigliani (1983).
See Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Mehra (2001).
25
The World Bank Country Report (2003)
26
See Akkoyunlu (2002), Ozcan et al. (2003)
24

13

The second and most important part of household wealth is housing. The
shallow financial markets (particularly before the liberalization in the early 1980s),
high inflation and political instability made housing the most popular investment tool
for households in Turkey. However, the available data on the number of existing
dwelling units and their values are very limited. The only available data for each year
on housing are the number of occupancy permits for each dwelling unit and their
values. The total stock of dwelling units for each year between 1970 and 2003 can be
estimated if the initial stock is known in 1970 and illegal constructions are ignored for
the entire period in question. Even though the high urbanization cast doubts on this
assumption, we use the relevant data from the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) as
checkpoints in generating an approximation of the stock of dwelling units 27 .
In the life-cycle theory, non-human wealth, which is a part of total lifetime
resources, contributes to consumption by its anticipated “purchasing power”. This
purchasing power is divisible into two parts: the additional income that wealth earns
and the consumption of this wealth itself (Hamburger 1955). In an economy with
superficial financial markets (without mortgage markets) and high bequest motives, the
second part of the purchasing power of housing wealth, i.e., the consumption of
housing wealth itself, could be considered weak relative to that of more developed
economies. Therefore, property incomes might be a better proxy for housing wealth
than the total value of the dwelling units in measuring the anticipated “purchasing
power” of the housing wealth. Therefore, instead of using an “approximated” total
value of dwellings as a proxy for housing wealth, we use “Ownership of Dwellings” 28 ,
which consists of direct and imputed incomes (net of inputs, representing the added
value) of owners from their dwellings.
The baseline consumption function, Equation (2), omits potentially important
factors that may influence consumption behaviors: credit constraints, demographic
trends, uncertainty, the separation of non-human wealth in terms of liquidity, and the
real interest rate. Therefore, we extend this baseline consumption function as follows
Ct = β0 + β1Yt e + β2 SSWt + β3 HWt + β4 FWt + β5CRTPt + β6 Rt + β7 Inft + β8Oldt + β9Youngt
+ β10LFPRt + β11Urbant + β12Unt

(3)

where HW denotes the housing wealth using “Ownership from Dwellings”, FW is
financial wealth, which is proxied by the Money-Quasi Money (M2), and CRPT is
“credit to private sector” representing the credit constraints. Inf is unexpected inflation,
as a proxy for uncertainty, calculated by the difference between the current and 3-year
moving average consumer price inflation.
The real interest rate, R, is calculated by adjusting nominal interest rates on oneyear time deposit accounts 29 . While R has two well-known effects on consumption,
substitution and income, it has a special importance in our case: all coefficients are
affected by a common factor, the real interest rate, as seen in Equation (1).
27

See Author(2005)
It’s from the National Accounts by Production, State Institute of Statistics (SIS).
⎛ i − π t ⎞ , where i denotes nominal rates, and π is the consumer price inflation.
29
⎟⎟
Intrt = ⎜⎜ t
⎝ 1+ π t ⎠
28
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Demographic variables have important roles in the life-cycle consumption
models. The stability of averaged coefficients in Equation (2) depends on how quickly
the demographic changes occur. Besides, according to LCM, while the young and
elderly consume more relative to their income, working age people are supposed to
save more and consume less 30 . We use Old and Young as dependency ratios, which are
the ratios of the number of people (people younger than 15 and older than 64) to the
working-age population (those ages 15-64), to see if their effects are different. Another
demographic variable, the ratio of urban population to the total population denoted by
Urban, could also be an important factor: a higher urbanization could lead to a decrease
in precautionary saving, and therefore a higher consumption could be expected.
Unemployment rate, Un, is used by Ando and Modigliani (1963) as a part of
permanent income. As Barro (1978) indicates, it would have a positive effect on
current consumption, if future income were positively related to the unemployment rate
given the value of current income and other factors. In other words, according to LCM,
when people are unemployed, they smooth their consumption by reducing their saving,
since they could anticipate that the current income is below the permanent income. On
the other hand, a high unemployment rate, which is a common observation in most
developing countries, might indicate uncertainty about the future income and therefore
suppress consumption (Feldstein 1978). Its effect on consumption, therefore, is not
necessarily positive.
The labor force participation rate, LFPR, is supposed to affect the relationship
between consumption and social security wealth: as the SSW increases it may push
consumption up. However, a higher SSW can create downward pressure on LFPR and
this may pull consumption down.
4.2 Estimations
As pointed in several time-series aggregate consumption studies 31 , the consumption
equations, which are linear in levels, may suffer from heteroskedasticity, with or
without unit roots, simply because of economic growth that causes the residual variance
to increase with time. Feldstein (1974, 1996) applies linear models in levels. Meguire
(1998) criticizes this approach by pointing out that “neither logged nor weighted”
(p.342) time-series linear models in levels may have heteroskedasticity problems,
which should be corrected. He uses weighted series by the lagged level of dependent
variable in his models. Coates et al. (1999) refer to the same problem in their
investigation of social security and prefer to apply models linear in levels. We also test
for heteroskedasticity in all estimations, which are linear in levels, by the White test.
We then decided to use levels. The first results are given in Figure 1 below.

30
31

See Modigliani (1986), Darby (1979).
See Mehra (2001), Coates and Humphreys (1999), Campell and Mankiw (1989), Meguire (1998).
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Figure 1: Estimation Results with SSWG
Equations

1

2

3

0.62683
0.05022
0.00385
0.00879
1.95662
0.45026
(0.05544)
0.07163
-

0.52183
0.08141
0.01913
0.01219
1.66721
0.60926
(0.18854)
0.08842
-

0.59112
0.071569
0.02114
0.010564
2.45531
0.427775
(0.22163)
0.07057
-

CRTP

-

-

Inf

-

-

Old

-

-

Young

-

-

LFPR

-

-

Un

-

-

Urban

-

-

Time

-

Income
SSWG
HW
FW
R

Dummy95
Constant
AR(1) Rho
AR(2) Rho
DW
R2
SSR
W
LM

4,081.28
2,752.08
44,884.28
24,816.18
146,748.80 236,464.60
60,249.83 78,831.86
0.51454
0.20631
1.14370
0.96475
25.1E+9
0.04213
-

1.53819
0.97194
16.2E+9
0.09371
0.01186

4

5

6

7

0.41034
0.30530
0.28483
0.16886
0.11616
0.07512
0.06942
0.07947
0.01256
0.01222
0.01917
0.02346
0.01081
0.00845
0.00827
0.00879
0.62445
1.41514
1.55203
1.27313
0.88683
0.35125
0.32706
0.35279
(0.23044)
(0.14375)
(0.17374)
(0.18193)
0.11091
0.06603
0.06181
0.06520
(102,348.10) (119,396.40) (110,872.60) (135,338.50)
71,917.01
43,173.77
39,755.31 42,421.80
0.33059
0.47303
0.47787
0.55697
0.13601
0.09655
0.08858
0.09575
(185.50)
447.89
(143,050.20)
109,456.40
(36,754.32)
23,516.29
8,932.35
5,695.40
(627,799.90)
608,390.20
(20,737.49)
14,950.77
3,457.18
22,370.24
7,539.39
8,054.35
10,521.57
2,153.01
11,557.03
1,901.79
1,757.21
1,966.36
42,615.37
53,414.29 57,871.49
18,034.58
21,982.47 23,207.58
123,574.00 2,701,405.00 321,834.10 320,572.00 402,502.20
66,485.42 1,740,420.00 60,892.92
55,855.17 62,823.22
0.74580
0.171172
(0.60402)
0.18203
1.79157
2.29047
1.96714
1.86096
2.13010
0.97732
0.98108
0.98171
0.98461
0.98289
11.5E+9
9.3E+9
11.7E+9
9.5E+9
10.5E+9
0.73767
0.65525
0.12718
0.45301
0.36136
0.56409
-

All variables are deflated to 1987 prices 32 and divided by population. SSW
series are gross and calculated by 2% income growth and 3% discount rates. The
benefit factors and coverage ratios used in SSW calculations are not average (constant)
and change every year. Standard errors are presented below the coefficients. R2 is
adjusted R2. SSR denotes the sum of squared residuals and negative numbers are in
32

Except for the unexpected inflation, interest rate and all ratios. By calculation, SSW series are per
capita and in real terms.
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parentheses
We use a dummy variable, Dummy95, to take care of the outlier 33 in 1995,
which is identified by observing the recursive residuals. 34 We also applied a dummy
variable for economic recessions and found that it’s statistically insignificant.
The first equation is without a correction for its apparent autocorrelation
problem. The series in Equations 2 are transformed by the first-degree autoregressive
AR(1) process. 35 We suspect that the specification of autocorrelation might be different
than the AR(1) process. Even though it is not possible to know the exact form of
autocorrelation, we add AR(2) to equation 2 and obtain the results in equations 3. When
the series are transformed by the AR(1) procedure, the first observations are lost.
Therefore we also applied Prais-Winsten transformation (with AR(1) scheme) to save
the first observations. We found insignificant differences in the coefficients with and
without the first observations, and therefore the results are not presented here. In
equation 4, we use the full scale of variables.
Since the DW statistic is not strictly applicable with autoregressive
transformations, we also use the Breusch-Godfrey test to diagnose a possible
autocorrelation, which is presented by the probability that there is no first-degree
autocorrelation and denoted by LM in Figure 1 above 36 . The results of White test 37 —
the probabilities that the estimations don’t suffer from heteroskedasticity — are shown
next to W.
As seen in Equations 4, except for CRTP, the new variables do not contribute to
the baseline consumption function defined in Equation (1) before. Very low pair wise
correlations show that their insignificances are not merely due to their collinearity with
each other. In equations 5 and 6, we remove the insignificant new additional variables38
and add the dummy variable in equation (6).
Since income is defined as NprvDI = C + I – GS + FS – CoC, there might be a
simultaneity problem. Therefore, in equation 7, we use GS, FS and I as instrumental
variables and apply two-stage least squares (TSLS). This application improves the
DW statistics as expected.
The first observation of all equations shows that the SSW variable has a stable
positive sign consistent with the model. Even though equation 3 improves the
significance of SSW, equations 1, 2 and 3 most likely suffer from possible specification
problems.
In equation 4, although not significant, the signs of demographic variables,

33

A severe economic crisis took place in 1994 with a 9-percent decrease in per capita real NprvDI. In
1995 it turned up with a 4-percent growth rate.
34
We plotted the recursive residuals (for Equation 1 in Figure 5), i.e., one-step-ahead prediction errors
(see Johnston and Dinardo. 1997. p. 118) about the zero line. Residuals outside the two standard error
bands are identified as outliers. We have two outliers: 1987 and 1995. However, a dummy for 1987
turned out to be insignificant with very high probability.
35
We assume that the error term follows the first-order autoregressive scheme in Equations 2 as follows:
μt = ρμt −1 + ε t where ε is a white noise process.
36

In computing LM statistics, we took the length of lags for residuals 1 with AR(1) and 2 for AR(2).
Without cross terms
38
We applied the Wald test and got very high p-values for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all
removed variables are jointly zero, except R
37
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Urban, Young and Old, contradict the model’s predictions. 39 As pointed in Ozcan et al.
(2003), this can be explained by the extended families under the poor economic and
financial conditions in Turkey. The increased number of dependent children and
elderly may reduce family resources, increase the economic burden, and pull the
consumption down. As for the urbanization, the rapid increase in the urban population
makes the living conditions in cities worse for new comers. Therefore, a high
urbanization in a short time may create an additional income uncertainty with the effect
of reducing consumption.
The sign of the proxy for financial wealth, FW, does not agree with the model’s
prediction in all regressions. However, there may be several reasons for this: the first
reason could be that the M2 series may not be a good proxy for the financial wealth
held by the private sector. As explained earlier, after the financial liberalization in the
markets, the money held by the private sector is mostly invested in short term
government bonds. Another reason might be that M2 is also an indicator for the
financial depth in an economy. Therefore, an increase in M2 can trigger higher savings
and therefore lower consumption 40 . Likewise, under the high inflation conditions, a
higher expected inflation may reduce real interest rates (given inelastic nominal rates,
which is especially true before the 1980s in Turkey) and therefore depress savings and
draw consumption up 41 . When the prices fall down (or a decrease in expected
inflation), which increases the real money balance in the markets, people save more and
consume less due to the increased real interest rates. Thus, through the price levels, the
real money balance could be negatively related to consumption.
Housing Wealth (HW) variable, which is represented by the income from
dwellings is statistically significant in all estimations, except for equation 4. As
explained before, this result is consistent with the fact that even though housing is the
major investment tool for households, it’s mostly bequeathed in Turkey. Therefore the
imputed income from the housing wealth has a significant effect on consumption.
As explained before, if people can borrow more against their future income and
current illiquid assets, they have more sources to consume. The significant relationship
between consumption and CRTP confirms this argument. Moreover, the real interest
rate has a negative and significant sign, which shows that substitution effect overweighs
the income effect. Although insignificant, the sign of unexpected inflation agrees with
the models prediction. Likewise, the rate of unemployment is insignificant and
negatively related to the consumption level, indicating that the future income
uncertainty embedded in unemployment prevails under poor financial and economic
conditions.
Among the equations 5, 6 and 7 in Figure 1, equation 6 has better test measures
relative to others in terms of R2 and SSR. Moreover, the inclusion of the dummy
variable improves Akaike and Schwarz criterions. Its DW statistics is 1.8609, which is
slightly higher than the upper level (1.86; n=34, k=8 with 0.01 significance level).
As Blinder et al. (1985) pointed, the important results should not be sensitive to
the choice between linear and logarithmic forms. Therefore, equation 6 is re-estimated
39

Akkoyunlu (2002) and Ozcan et.al (2003) find similar insignificant results for demographic variables in
their consumption and saving studies for Turkey .
40
Ozcan et al. (2003) find a significant positive effect of M2/GDP on private savings in Turkey
41
Akkoyunlu (2002) indicates that inflation in Turkey has positive effects on consumption.
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with the logarithmic transformation (except for real interest rate). As seen in Figure 2
below, the SSW variable is statistically significant with 10% significance level.
Figure 2: Estimation with Log Transformation
Variable
C
Y
SSWG HW
7.4326 0.3156 0.0378 0.1154
Coefficient
1.2565 0.0912 0.0191 0.0249
Std. Error
5.9153 3.4617 1.9759 4.6416
t-Statistic
0.0000 0.0019 0.0593 0.0001
Prob.
Adjusted R-squared 0.98271 Durbin-Watson stat
1.13E-02 F-statistic
Sum squared resid

FW
(0.1450)
0.0419
(3.4576)
0.0020
1.763567
235.3797

R
(0.0928)
0.0503
(1.8446)
0.0770

CRTP DUMMY95 Time
0.1448
0.0115
0.0487
0.0287
0.0025
0.0240
5.0476
4.6452
2.0319
0.0000
0.0001
0.0529

The SSW variable has a significant positive sign in equation (6), which
confirms that the social security wealth has a positive effect on consumption, thus
negative effect on saving. The results, in Figure 3 below, show that the net or gross
definition of SSW does not alter the sign agreement and significance level of SSW.
This result is also consistent with the notion that the future taxes are included in the
expected future income and therefore the correct measure should be gross social
security wealth, as indicated in Feldstein’s (1974, 1996) results.
Figure 3: Estimation Results with SSWN
Variable
C
Y
SSWN
Coefficient
300,004 0.3126 0.0165
55,934 0.0675 0.0076
Std. Error
5.3636 4.6293 2.1653
t-Statistic
0.0000 0.0001 0.0401
Prob.
Adjusted R-squared 0.98425
Sum squared resid 9.68E+09

HW
FW
R
CRTP DUMMY95 Time
1.6587 (0.1653) (112,334) 0.4949
49,561
7,688
0.3392 0.0617 40,202 0.0900
21,814
1,721
4.8893 (2.6783) (2.7943) 5.4999
2.2720
4.4667
0.0000 0.0129 0.0098 0.0000
0.0320
0.0001

Durbin-Watson stat
F-statistic

1.82
258.81

As pointed before, the SSW series are calculated with the “current factors”
method and 3% discount rate in Figure 1. However, the regression results should be
tested against these assumptions embedded in the SSW calculations.
4.3 Tests of Assumptions
As explained earlier, we used three alternative expectation methods in
calculating the SSW series: the average (constant), adaptive, and current benefit (and
tax) factor methods. Since there are strong negative trends in both benefit and tax
factors, we used only the adaptive and current factor methods. The results in Figure 1,
2 and 3 were found by the current benefit and tax methods. Therefore, Figure 4 below
shows only the adaptive expectation results.
Figure 4: Estimation Results with Adaptive Expectations
Variable
C
Y
SSWG HW
Coefficient
330,511 0.2706 0.0189 1.4512
57,941 0.0740 0.0091 0.3321
Std. Error
5.7042 3.6564 2.0734 4.3697
t-Statistic
0.0000 0.0012 0.0486 0.0002
Prob.
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FW
R
CRTP DUMMY95 Time
(0.1655) (107,168) 0.5053 49405.3
8,243
0.0636 41,307 0.0912
22,008
1,889
(2.6035) (2.5944) 5.5390
2.2449
4.3628
0.0153 0.0156 0.0000
0.0339
0.0002

0.98404
Adjusted R-squared
Sum squared resid 9.81E+09

Durbin-Watson stat
F-statistic

1.773714
255.373

The other assumption is about the discount rate. In Figure 5 below, the discount rate is
changed from 3% to 5% and the SSW series are gross and calculated by both the
current and adaptive expectations methods, denoted by (cr) and (ae) respectively.
Figure 5: Estimation Results with 5% Discount Rate
SSWG-cr
C
Y
SSWG HW
324,313 0.2837 0.0310 1.5474
Coefficient
55,581 0.0687 0.0128 0.3241
Std. Error
5.8350 4.1266 2.4281 4.7748
t-Statistic
0.9849 Durbin-Watson stat
Adjusted R-squared
Sum squared resid 9.30E+09 F-statistic

FW
R
(0.1819) (110,525)
0.0626 39,364
(2.9077) (2.8078)
1.872753
269.4626

CRTP DUMMY95 Time
0.4846
54,604
7,958
0.0879
21,874
1,706
5.5140
2.4963
4.6637

SSWG-ae
C
Y
SSWG HW
FW
R
334,354 0.2688 0.0313 1.4527 (0.1767) (106,627)
Coefficient
57,518 0.0728 0.0141 0.3283 0.0645 40,674
Std. Error
5.8130 3.6942 2.2285 4.4248 (2.7381) (2.6215)
t-Statistic
0.9844 Durbin-Watson stat
1.7947
Adjusted R-squared
261.2627
Sum squared resid 9.59E+09 F-statistic

CRTP DUMMY95 Time
0.5111
51,171
8,189
0.0905
21,887
1,818
5.6474
2.3380
4.5045

These results show that the sign and significance of the SSW variable are not sensitive
to major assumptions. The DW statistics are between the lower and upper limits (with
0.01 significance), and therefore whether they have serial correlation problems is
indeterminate. However, as indicated before, they have a simultaneity problem tested
by the Hausman method 42 . When TSLS is used, the significance of SSW doesn’t
change but DW improves as shown in equation 7 in Figure 1
4.4 Alternative Proxies for Social Security
Even though SSW, the present value of future social security entitlements with
survival probabilities, is the best proxy for people’s perception of social security
wealth, other alternative proxies can be used to test whether or not social security
provisions affect consumption behaviors.
We used two proxies for social security: per capita real old-age benefits (SSA1)
and a variable (SSA2) that is similar to one used by Barro (1978). This second proxy is
calculated as a product of per retiree real old-age benefits, the cover ratio, 43 and the
total number of workers 44 . The results are presented in Figure 6 below show that the
provision of social security has positive and statistically significant 45 effects on
consumption.

42

The forecasted income and residuals are obtained by using the reduced form income equation, which
includes instrumental variables. When Equation 6 in Figure 1 was re-estimated with the forecasted
income and residuals, I found that residuals are statistically significant with the t-value of 8.3.
43
The cover ratio is the ratio of the number of workers covered by social security to the total employment.
44
The data on employment is from SIS and Bulutay (1995).
45
The second proxy is significant with 10% confidence level.
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Figure 6: Estimation Results with Alternative Proxies
Variable
C
Y
SSA1 HW
FW
R
CRTP DUMMY95 Time
366,170 0.2856 1.5418 1.3328 (0.2204) (110,868) 0.5286
59,182
6,571
Coefficient
56,721 0.0648 0.5205 0.3132 0.0649 37,299 0.0858
21,097
1,444
Std. Error
6.4557 4.4097 2.9623 4.2560 (3.3967) (2.9724) 6.1606
2.8052
4.5501
t-Statistic
0.0000 0.0002 0.0066 0.0003 0.0023 0.0065 0.0000
0.0096
0.0001
Prob.
0.9862 Durbin-Watson stat
Adjusted R-squared
Sum squared resid 8.51E+09 F-statistic
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.

C
306,470
57,059
5.3711
0.0000

Y
0.2927
0.0716
4.0867
0.0004

SSA2
0.2720
0.1440
1.8888
0.0706

1.9077
294.87

HW
FW
R
CRTP DUMMY95 Time
1.5580 (0.1514) (112,062) 0.4705
48,716
8,301
0.3382 0.0619 41,385 0.0914
22,347
1,988
4.6067 (2.4470) (2.7078) 5.1470
2.1800
4.1743
0.0001 0.0218 0.0120 0.0000
0.0389
0.0003

0.98363 Durbin-Watson stat
Adjusted R-squared
Sum squared resid 1.01E+10 F-statistic

1.808979
248.9205

4.5 Tests for Spurious Regressions
A spurious regression model is one in which the dependent and independent
variables are non-stationary, but not cointegrated. Granger and Newbold (1974)
observed that even when the series are independent of each other, the classical spurious
regressions had very high R-squared (R2) statistics with very low Durbin-Watson (DW)
statistics. Since our regressions use time-series data, we need to test whether the high
degree of fit in the estimations, as measured by high R2 and significant t-tests, is a
result of “spurious significance”. The time series literature in our subject implicitly
uses DW statistics to detect the “spurious significance” problem. Phillips (1986)
developed an asymptotic theory that the DW statistic in spurious regressions converges
in probability to zero as the sample size increases. 46
In order to test whether the variables used in our regressions are stationary
around a linear trend or have stochastic trends, we first perform the augmented DickeyFuller test (ADF) for the presence of unit roots in the variables. As seen in Table 4
below, Old, Young, and Urban are I(2); Rintr and Inf are I(0) and the rest are I(1).

46

The Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test uses the DW statistics, d, obtained from the
cointegrating regression to test the null hypothesis of d = 0. If d could be approximated by 2(1-r) and the
sample first-order correlation coefficient, r, is about 1 (indicating a unit root in the error term), d will be
zero. (Sargan and Bhargava 1983). Therefore, a low DW statistics could be taken as a strong sign of
spurious significance. Nevertheless, Maddala and Kim (1998) indicate that regressions with high DW
statistics do not necessarily ensure that we do not estimate spurious regressions especially if the sample
size is relatively small.
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Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Results for Unit Roots

Variables
CONS
Y
SSWG
SSWN
HW
FW
Rintr
CRTP
Inf
Old
Young
LFPR
Un
Urban
SSWGAE
SSWG5
SSWG5AE
SSA1
SSA2
LCONS
LCRTP
LHW
LFW
LSSWG
LY

Level
ADF t-test
Lag c&t
-3.511099
0
ct
-2.051519
0
ct
-0.805777
2
ct
-0.246096
2
ct
-1.953167
1
c
-1.875746
1
ct
0
-2.698091
-3.294444
1
ct
1
-4.720763
-2.091723
1
ct
-2.710636
1
ct
-1.896337
0
ct
-3.011565
1
c
-2.310802
1
ct
-0442997
1
ct
-0.708768
2
ct
-0.290429
2
ct
-0.933166
1
ct
-1.539332
1
ct
-2.712982
1
ct
-3.554406
1
ct
-2.098230
1
c
-2.105252
0
ct
-1.797932
1
ct
-2.443473
0
ct

1st Difference
ADF t-test
Lag c&t
0
-7.447739
0
-5.749789
1
-4.103717
1
ct
-4.909395
0
-4.332534
1
-2.281867
-5.305846

1

-1.250801
-0.991528
-6.240468
-4.700727
-0.916081
-4.640900
-4.021000
-3.757103
-2.835510
-3.580142
-7.328273
-5.418992
-3.931846
-5.397414
-4.334073
-5.915426

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0

2nd Difference
ADF t-test
Lag
c&t

-5.496650
-5.469800

0
0

-5.477230

0

c

ct

c

Notes: The test results are obtained by Eviews. Bold numbers are significant at 5% level to reject the
null hypothesis states the presence of unit root. We start with four lags in each variable’s ADF regression.
The longest lag is determined by its significance at 10%. The existence of a constant and time trend in the
ADF regressions is indicated by c and t respectively. All variables are as defined before. AE and 5
attached to SSWG indicate the adaptive expectation method used in the benefit ratio and 5% discount rate
respectively. The variables that start with L (except LFPR) are the log transformation of the original ones.

Any equilibrium relationship among a set of nonstationary variables implies that
their stochastic trends must be linked. This linkage among the stochastic trends
necessitates that the variables be cointegrated. Therefore, a key assumption of our
consumption model is that the disturbance term is stationary. Since our interest in the
current context is not to estimate coefficients of the cointegrating vector, we use a
residual-based test for cointegration in a single equation suggested by Engle and
Granger (1987) to investigate if the residuals in our regressions are stationary.47 We
perform the ADF test on our reference regression (Equation 6) in Figure 1 and on the
other equations from Figure 2 to 6. As Enders (1995) argues, even though the order of
integration among variables is important to perform the test, what is ultimately
47

We have also used the Johansen (1988) test for the presence of multiple cointegrating vectors. The
results confirm the residual-based ADF test.
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important is whether or not a combination of variables are cointegrated, and this could
be achieved through combination of subsets rather than individual series. 48 In our case,
since Rintr is I(0), we test whether the same equations (including only I(1) variables)
without Rintr are CI(1,1).
The test results in Table 5 below show that the subsets of I(1) variables are
CI(1,1) at 5% significance level except for Figure 2, which is CI(1,1) at 10%. We
conclude that since a linear combination of any of these subsets, which are I(0), with
Rintr, which is I(0), can only generate a stationary process, the resulting regressions are
not spurious.
Table 5: Residual-Based Cointegration Tests

Figure1-6
Figure2
Figure3
Figure4
Figure5-1
Figure5-2
Figure6-1
Figure6-2

(Cons, Y, SSWG, HW, FW, CRTP)
(LCons, LY,LSSWG, LHW, LFW, LCRTP)
(Cons, Y, SSWN, HW, FW, CRTP)
(Cons, Y, SSWGAE, HW, FW, CRTP)
(Cons, Y, SSWG5, HW, FW, CRTP)
(Cons, Y, SSWGAE5, HW, FW, CRTP)
(Cons, Y, SSA1, HW, FW, CRTP)
(Cons, Y, SSA2, HW, FW, CRTP)

ADF t-test
-6.0712
-5.5767
-6.0629
-5.8921
-6.0586
-5.9070
-5.8456
-5.9902

Lag
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Notes: The results are obtained by Eviews. The null hypothesis states no cointegration among the
variables. MacKinnon (1991) provides response surface equations for critical values of cointegration tests
using ADF framework for different sample sizes, significance levels, and number of variables in the
cointegrating equation. Given six stochastic explanatory variables with a constant and time trend in our
cointegrating equations, the critical values calculated for the sample size of 34 are -6.4621 for 1%, 5.5987 for 5%, and
-5.1836 for 10%. Optimal lag is chosen using Akaike information criterion (AIC). Each equation has a
dummy for the year 1995.

5. Conclusion

This paper investigates whether or not the public social security system affects
consumption in a developing country, Turkey. It uses a time-series aggregate
consumption model based on the life-cycle hypothesis. In order to quantify a social
security variable in the model, the social security wealth series for Turkey were
constructed (in a separate study). These series indicate that the social security wealth is
a major component of household wealth.
The empirical tests here show that SSW has a positive effect on consumption.
Moreover, when the insignificant variables are removed it becomes statistically
significant. The sensitivity of these results was tested against the major assumptions
48

Enders (1995, 411) gives an example: “Suppose that x1t and x2t are I(2) and x3t is I(1). If x1t and x2t are
CI(2,1), there exists a linear combination of the form b1x1t+b2x2t that is I(1). It is possible that this
combination of x1t and x2t is cointegrated with x3t such that the linear combination of b1x1t+b2x2t+b3x3t is
stationary”.
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embedded in the SSW calculation. The test results confirm that the significance level of
SSW does not change.
In addition to the SSW series, “Income from Dwellings” and “Money and
Quasi-money”, M2, are used as proxies for housing wealth and financial wealth
respectively. The first proxy for housing wealth has a significant positive effect on
consumption. This is consistent with the fact that people under the conditions of
shallow financial markets and high political instability invest heavily in housing.
However, high bequest motives, together with the lack of proper financial instruments,
such as mortgages, may reduce its power, as an asset, on consumption. Therefore, the
direct and imputed income from dwellings may reflect the “true” effects of housing
wealth on consumption, as we found in our regressions.
Although significant, the sign of financial assets (FW) contradicts the model.
However, as noted before, through the price levels, the real money balance could be
negatively related to consumption. For example, if nominal interest rates are not so
responsive to a decline in inflation, as the inflation goes down, it pushes saving up by
increasing real interest rates.
Even though time-series studies have several limitations, in order to assess the
quantitative importance of the positive coefficient of SSW variable, one may want to see
the magnitude of the reduction in Turkish national saving. With different assumptions
and social security wealth definitions, the coefficient ranges from 0.0165 (Figure 3) to
0.0313 (Figure 5). In other words, every additional 1 TL of SSW increases the total
consumption between 0.0165 and 0.0313 TL. For instance, if we take 2003 and SSWN
(283,310,716 million TL, with 1987 prices) the consumption is higher 4,816,282 million
TL (283,310,716 X 0.0165) than would be the case without any social security program.
If we consume instead of saving by this amount, the private saving falls. Since Turkey
has a PAYG system, this reduction is not offset by any increase in the public saving. As
a result, the national saving falls as well. Moreover, the private disposable income is
reduced by the total contributions (taxes for the old-age, disability and survivor
insurance). The total premiums paid in 2003 to SSK, EM and BK is 5,943,740 million
TL (with 1987 prices). Since the marginal propensity to save out of NPrvDI is around
72% (Figure 1, Equation 6), we can conclude that social security contributions also
reduce saving by 4,279,493 million TL. Therefore, because of the PAYG system, the
total saving is lower 9,095,775 million TL (4,279,493 + 4,816,282) than would be the
case without a PAYG system in Turkey. National saving in 2003 (by SPO, in 1987
prices, million TL):
Total Saving
Foreign Sources
Government Saving (-)
Private Saving

29,482,465
5,256,678
5,743,524
29,969,310

Without considering the negative effects of the current PAYG system on public saving,
this implies a 24-percent reduction (9,095,775/(9,095,775 + 29,482,465)) in Turkish
national saving in 2003. This reduction is calculated by SSWN and its coefficient,
0.0165. However, if we use SSWG and its coefficients estimated with different
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assumptions, the reduction becomes higher than 24%. Feldstein (1974, 1996) makes the
same calculation and finds that social security depresses personal saving 30-60 percent
for the US.
As Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) point out, time-series studies have several
drawbacks in estimating the effects of social security on saving. Moreover, the
empirical analyses could be extended to include some omitted variables, such as
external and government savings by disaggregating the income variable 49 . Likewise,
the SSW variable could also be improved by doing further “fine-tunings”. Lastly, as
commonly used in investigations, error correction models with flexible distributed lags
can be applied.
But this paper’s goal was limited: determining whether or not a time-series
aggregate consumption model for a developing country, Turkey, could provide
relatively consistent evidence that the social security wealth has negative effects on
saving as argued in the literature for developed countries. Turkey has a generous public
social security system. The results, with both social security proxies, show that social
security wealth has a significant positive effect on consumption, and this could be
interpreted that public social security reduces saving in Turkey.
If social security provisions reduce saving, as shown here, there should be an
“opportunity cost” of having an unfunded social security system, regardless of whether
or not it is in balance. Therefore, reforms ultimately need to address two problems
together: financial sustainability of social security systems over the coming decades
and their negative effects on saving.

49

Since an increase in external saving raises the total sources available for the private sector, it might be
positively related to consumption. Besides, given the value of government spending, an increase or
decrease in government saving may have a direct effect on the total sources available for the private
sector. The effects of government saving on consumption could be explained from a national accounting
perspective. As you may recall, we define the net private disposable income (NPrvDI) as follows:
NPrvDI = NNP – TX + TR + NINT (a)
Since Government Saving (GS) can be defined as follows:
GS = TX – G – TR – NINT Î TR + NINT – TX = - GS - G (b)
when we substitute (b) into (a) we get the following expression:
NPrvDI = NNP – GS – G
Therefore, the income variable, NPrvDI, in the regressions, implicitly assumes that the sum of the
coefficients of NNP, GS and G are restricted to be the same as the coefficient of NPrvDI. If we relax this
restriction, we can observe whether or not GS and G have different negative effects on consumption.
Observation of this effect is not possible with the standard LCM approach.
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Appendix: Social Security Wealth Series for Turkey

SSW is the aggregate present value of future social security annuities with survival
probabilities anticipated by people. Since it’s a highly concentrated work, we
constructed the SSWG and SSTX series for Turkey in a different study (Author, 2005).
Therefore, we present here only the basic logic of the calculations for the net and gross
social security wealth (SSWN and SSWG), which is very similar to one calculated by
Feldstein (1974).
Benefits (Future Annuities -- SSWG):
• If an individual at the age of (a) in year (t) survives to age ra 50 , and if his
current real disposable income, Y( a ,t ) , grows at a constant rate of growth, g, then
•
•
•
•

•

he’ll have a disposable income at the age of ra: Yt + ra − a = Yt (1 + g ) ( ra − a )
In order to find the first annual social security benefit at ra for that particular
individual, we look at the past data and come up with a benefit factor, bf, which
is basically a ratio of per retiree annual old-age benefits to per capita NPrvDI 51 .
Given that factor, the individual will be entitled to his first annual social
security benefit at age ra, which is B( a ,t ) = bf t Yt (1 + g ) ( ra − a ) .
We assume that real annuities grow after ra by ga 52 until the truncated
maximum age of 85.
Given the survival probabilities S (i , j ) for that particular individual, the actuarial
present value can be calculated at the age of ra, where S ( i , j ) presents the
probability of living at least up to the age of j, given that the person lived to age
i.
With the personal discount rate (d) 53 for future real incomes, the present value
calculation becomes at the age of ra:
∑ S ( ra ,n) B( a,t ) (1 + g ) ( n−ra ) (1 + d ) −( n−ra )
n ≥ ra

•

At time (t), after substituting B( a ,t ) , the person has

A( a ,t ) = bf t Yt S ( a ,ra ) [(1 + g ) /(1 + d )]

( ra − a )

•

∑

S ( ra ,85) [(1 + g ) /(1 + d )]

(85− ra )

85≥ ra

which also includes survival probabilities between ra and age a at time (t).
We calculated the gross SSW annually by summing the wealth for each age
groups an genders in six groups: workers, workers’ wives, old-age retirees, oldage retirees’ wives, disability retirees and survivors.

Taxes (future social security tax liabilities – SSTX):
• If the same individual at the age of (a) in year (t) survives to age ra, and if his
50

We assume that the retirement age is not endogenous. That is, people get retired at the same age, which
is 55 for both genders in our calculations.
51
We use three different expectation methods for benefit (and tax) factors: average (constant) factors, the
adaptive expectation method (with arbitrarily chosen weights: 50% for the first year and 25% for the last
two years each) and current benefit (and tax) factors method.
52
We assumed that the growth rate of real annuities can be 2% or zero.
53
We used 3% and 5% alternatively.
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current real disposable income, Y( a ,t ) , grows at a constant rate of growth, g, then
the present value of all his future taxes until age ra is
ra

TAX a ,t = ∑ S a ,mθ t + m − a Yt [(1 + g ) /(1 + d )]

m−a

, where θ is the ratio of social

m=a

security taxes (Old-age, disability and survival — ODS) per worker to per
capita disposable income and the person expects that at the age m he will pay a
tax of Tt + m − a = θ t + m − a Yt (1 + g ) m − a . We compute the social security tax liabilities
(SSTX) for a given year by summing the tax liability of current working men
and working women.
When we subtract the present value of future taxes (SSTX) from the present value of
benefits (SSWG), we find SSWN: SSWN t = SSWGt − SSTX t . Aggregated SSWG and
SSTX formulas for each group are given in Figure 7. Assumptions, data sources and
more detail can be found in Author (2005).
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Figure 7: Aggregate SSWG and SSTX Formulas for Turkey
SSWG
ra

∑ (Wa ,t / Pa ,t ) G CtG bf t G Yt S (Ga ,ra ) [(1 + g ) /(1 + d )]

SSWGt =

Workers

( ra − a )

a =15

( n − ra )

85

∑ S (Gra ,n ) [(1 + ga) /(1 + d )]

n = ra

Workers’ Wives
ra

SSWGt = ∑(Wa,t / Pa,t ) C bft sr Yt (BR)(S
M
t

M

a=15

M

M

F
( a−3,ra)

)(1 − S

M
( a,ra)

)[(1 + g) /(1 + d )]

( ra−a)

85

∑S

n=ra

F
( ra,n−3)

[(1+ ga) /(1+ d )](ra−n)

Plus
ra

∑ (Wa,t / Pa,t ) M CtM bft M sr M Yt (BR)(S(Fa−3,ra) )(S (Ma,ra) )[(1 + g) /(1 + d )]

( ra− a )

a =15

Retirees
Retirees’ Wives

SSWGt = N tG AVBtG

85

∑S

n = ara

G
( ara , n )

∑ (S

n = ra

F
( ra, n −3)

85

∑ (S

n = ara
85

F
( ara , n − 3)

Survivors – Orphans

( n − ra)

)(1 − S (Mara ,n ) )[(1 + ga ) /(1 + d )]

( n − ara )

SSWGt = NDtG ( ABDt ) ∑ S (Gara ,n ) [(1 + ga ) /(1 + d )]

( n − ara )

n = ara
85

Survivors -- Wives

)(1 − S (Mra,n) )[(1 + ga) /(1 + d )]

[(1 + ga) /(1 + d )]( n −ara )

SSWG t = N tM ( sr M )( BR ) AVBtM

Disability Retirees

85

SSWGt = NS tw ( ABSWt ) ∑ S (Fara ,n ) [(1 + ga ) /(1 + d )]
SSWGt = NS tO ( ABSOt )

( n − ara )

n = ara
ara +10

∑S

n = ara

F
( ara , n )

[(1 + ga ) /(1 + d )]( n−ara )

SSTX
Workers

SSTX t =

ra

ra

a =15

m=a

∑ (Wa,t / Pa,t ) G CtGθ tG Yt ∑ S aG,m [(1 + g ) /(1 + d )]

m−a

M = Male, F = Female, G=Gender, t = year, a = age at time t, ra = retirement age, ara = average age for retirees, m =
age between current age a and retirement age ra, n = age between retirement age ra and the maximum age, 85, w=
wives, O=orphans, d = personal discount rate, g = growth rate of real reference income, ga= growth rate of real
annuities, W = number of employers, P = LFPR adjustment factor, C = ratio of active insured employment to total
employment, θ = tax factor, Y = reference income, AVB = per retiree average old-age benefit, ABD= per retiree average
disability benefit, ABSW= per retiree (wives) average survivors benefit, ABSO= per retiree (orphans) average survivors
benefit S ( a , m ) = survival probability of a person who lives up to age m, given that she/he lived up to age a, bf = benefit
factor, N = number of old-age beneficiaries, sr = % of male married, BR = discount ratio for benefits passed from worker
or retirees to survivors.
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